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NEW TRIALS ON THE ISSUE OF
DAMAGES ALONE
KENNETH M. WORMWOOD of the Denver Bar

Only recently has the general public awakened to a real danger
threatening our economic system today. Jury verdicts in damage
suits have become increasingly, and in the writer's opinion, alarmingly, higher. Verdicts of $150,000 to $250,000 are not uncommon
in some jurisdictions. While such verdicts are still the exception
in most jurisdictions, many verdicts of much smaller amounts, if
excessive, soon add up to a staggering total.
In the last few years a drive for a "more adequate award"
has been made by some plaintiffs' attorneys. Newspapers have
inadvertently assisted in teaching prospective jurors to return
exorbitant verdicts by publicizing the fact that a suit has been
instituted for large damages. If a large verdict is returned this
receives headlines. If the defendants obtain a verdict there is no
mention of it in the paper or if there is it is usually buried on
page 34 near the obituaries. Newspaper reporters seem to feel
that the fact the defendant is successful in a damage suit is not
news.
Many young attorneys, and unfortunately some older ones, file
damage suits wherein they seek damages of several hundred thousand dollars when they know that a verdict of $10,000 might well
be excessive. But, newspapers will publicize the filing of a suit
demanding $100,000, whereas they are apt not to mention a suit
for $10,000. This appears to be a sign of the times; just one of
the evils of our "something for nothing" age.
Insurance companies are now attempting to combat this situation through an educational program such as advertisements calling the public's attention to the fact that in the long run it is the
individual citizen who pays the bill through an increase in his
insurance premiums. Magazines have now started to run articlesattempting to educate the public along this line.
We are hopeful that some day newspapers will report on the
defense verdicts as they do on the plaintiffs' verdicts. An example of this reporting comes to the writer's mind. Recently two
doctors were sued for $50,000 damages because, as the plaintiff
alleged, they performed a vasectomy upon the plaintiff instead of
a circumcision. The suit made the front page of the daily paper
on several occasions, including large headlines when the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $33,700.00.
Some months later the Supreme Court reversed the lower Court
with instructions to enter a judgment of dismissal. Did this appear
on the front page? Of course not. A small four-paragraph article
appeared on one of the inside pages.
*Reprinted from the Federation of Insurance Counsel Quarterly, Volume 4,
Number 2, January, 1954.
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Unfortunately, this thought of large damages in these days
of inflation, has affected some of our courts. We do not mean to
infer that the courts have intentionally done anything wrong but
we do feel that some judges have been guilty of improper thinking; that they have been unconsciously led or pushed into approving methods for obtaining or allowing large damages which are
not sound in factor or theory.
In line with the present-day thinking, an instruction to the
jury advising them that in arriving at the amount of their verdict
they may take into consideration the present purchasing power
of the dollar and that such purchasing power is clearly lessened
at the present time has been approved by many courts.' Just one
more example of ways to obtain "the more adequate award."
With all of the above problems facing the defense attorney,
plus the ever-present problem of the jury knowing that an insurance company is probably the "real party in interest," it would
seem that he has his work well cut out for him. There is, however,
still another ever-present danger which faces the defense attorney. It is a danger which many attorneys do not appreciate until
after they have been struck by it. We refer to the danger of a
jury returning a verdict for the plaintiff for inadequate damages
so that either the trial or appellate court grants a new trial on the
issue of damages alone.
We know of no more helpless feeling than to hear the trial
court advise the second jury that the issue of liability has been
determined in a prior suit and that the only question they will be
called upon to determine is the amount of damages to be awarded
the plaintiff. One has not suffered the "tortures of hell" until he
has gone through such a trial.
We assume that such a situation would not usually arise in
states which now have comparative negligence statutes (Georgia,
Mississippi, Nebraska, South Dakota and Wisconsin). If the verdict in one of these states was for less than the amount of the
proven damages, we assume the court would feel that the jury
had arrived at its figure on the basis of comparative negligence.
We have not studied the law in these comparative negligence states.
However, in most of the rest of the states where contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery, the problem has often arisen.
As we will point out hereafter, we make no criticism of the granting of a new trial on the issue of damages alone in the proper case,
but in our opinion such a case should be the exception rather than
the general rule as it now seems to be. New trials on the issue of
damages alone are being granted in alarmingly increasing numbers.
The granting of a new trial on the issue of damages alone is
not a new procedure. At common law, there was no practice of
setting aside a verdict in part. If the verdict was erroneous with
respect to any issue, then a new trial was directed as to all issues.
' New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Soilean, 167 F. (2d) 767 (1948); Dabareiner v. Weisfiog, 253 Wis. 23, 33 N.W.

(2d)

220, 12 ALR (2d)

605 (1948).
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However, even before the court rules so provided, the rule became
well established that in a proper case an appellate court had the
a case, to grant a new trial
power at common law, upon reversing
2
on the issue of damages alone.
The authority to grant a new trial is now given by statute in
most states. Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues * * *
There being no dispute as to the court's right to grant a new
trial on the sole issue of damages, the only question remaining is
when is it proper to grant same?
Undoubtedly the outstanding and most cited case on this question is that of Simmons v. Fish,3 decided in 1912. This case recognized that there could "be no doubt as to the power of the court
at common law to set aside a verdict as a whole for insufficient
as well as for excessive damages" and then further held that under
its "inherent judicial authority" it could exercise its power and
limit the new trial to "specific points in case where the error committed at the trial was so limited in character as with justice to
both parties to be separable from the other issues determined by
the first verdict." The court sets forth the important part of the
rule by stating:
It is a power which ought to be exercised with great
caution with a careful regard to the rights of both parties, and only in those infrequent cases where it is certain
and plain that error which has crept into one element of
the verdict by no means can have affected its other elements.
While Simmons v. Fish is repeatedly cited by other courts as
authority for their granting a new trial on the issue of damages
alone, it is interesting to note that the court did not grant such
a new trial in that case. The court in that case recognized the fact
that the low amount of damages awarded indicated a compromise
by the jurors on the question of liability and therefore the questions were not separable. The court noted that the liability was
contested at the trial and that the low amount of damages awarded
the plaintiff "could have been reached only by certain of the panel
conceding their conscientious belief that the defendant ought to
prevail upon the merits in order that a decision might be reached."
The court warns of the danger and injustice, which unfortunately
has entered into many later decisions, with the following remarks:
It would be a gross injustice to set aside such a verdict as to damages alone against the protest of a defendant, and force him to a new trial with the issue of liability
'Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 75 L. Ed.
1188 (1931); Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 97 N.E. 102 (1912).
SSiipra, note 2.
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closed against him when it is obvious that no jury had
ever decided that issue against him on justifiable grounds.
Another case cited almost as much as the Simmons v. Fish
case as authority for granting a new trial on the issue of damages
alone is that of Norfolk v. Southern Railroad Co. 4 In this case,
the United States Supreme Court, while affirming the Supreme
Court of South Carolina in allowing such a new trial, observed:
Damages and contributory negligence are so blended
and interwoven, and the conduct of the plaintiff at the
time of the accident is so important a matter in the assessment of damages, that the instances would be rare in
which it would be proper to submit to a jury the question of damages without also permitting them to consider
the conduct of the plaintiff at the time of injury.
The court ends by stating that they "recognize that the practice
is not to be commended."
Irrespective of this warning by the court in these two leading
cases, the various state and Federal Courts proceed to grind out
decision after decision granting new trials on the issue of damages alone and assuming that the issues of liability and damages
were severable and that the jury came to a final conclusion on the
issue of liability before ever considering the question of damages.
Time will not permit us to examine and digest all of the cases
on this question. A hurried examination of cases in various jurisdictions indicates that the appellate courts are more and more
assuming that the issues of liability and damages are separable.
For those interested, an excellent annotation including a citation
of many cases may be found following the opinion in Gasoline
Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co.7, We do desire to take one
of the state supreme courts and follow its line of thinking. We
select the Supreme Court of Colorado as a typical court in this
respect.
As early as 1909 the Colorado Supreme Court recognized the
rule that if the amount of damages was not consistent with the
evidence, a new
trial should be granted, but granted such new trial
6
on all issues.
The first - personal injury suit where the question of inadequate damages arose was where the jury awarded the plaintiff $1.
The Court granted a new trial on all issues and remarked that the
verdict "must have been rendered under the influence of passion
or prejudice or by some misconception of the law or the evidence." 7
It apparently never occurred to the court that this might have
been a compromise among the jurors on the question of liability.
238 U.S. 269, 59 L. Ed. 1303 (1915).
Supra, note 2.
6Burns-Moore Mining & Tunnel Co. v. Watson, 45 Colo. 91, 101 Pac. 332
(1940).
Ferrari v. Brooks-Harrison Fuel Co., 53 Colo. 259, 125 Pac. 125 (1912),
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The next decision is most amazing." The court relies upon
Simmons v. Fish for its authority and we are sure that Mr. Chief
Justice Rugg, author of the opinion in the Simmons v. Fish case,
could never be convinced that his opinion was authority for the
decision reached by the Colorado Court. The facts in this case 8
were that the suit was originally tried in the County Court to the
judge without a jury who returned a judgment for the plaintiff
in the sum of $453. Thereafter the case was appealed to the District Court and as a trial de novo was tried by a jury. The jury,
after lengthy deliberation, sent a note to the trial judge signed
by its foreman which read:
There is no possibility of the jury agreeing in this
case.
The judge then gave the jury an additional instruction as to
the desirability of them reaching a verdict and thereafter the jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $1. The plaintiff
in support of a motion for a new trial, attached an affidavit from
the foreman which read:
The verdict reached in the above case did not represent the true beliefs of the members of said jury as to
the merits of the case, but was a compromise arrived at
in accordance with the wishes of the court that the jury
agree; that the amount of damages found did not, in the
opinion of the jury, represent the true damages, but was
an arbitrary award made for the purpose of a compromise verdict.
"Believe it or not," the trial court granted a new trial on the issue
of damages alone and the Supreme Court upheld such action, stating that "the question of liability had been fairly and without
compromise adjudged against defendant, and that the submission
to the second jury of the sole question of the amount of damages
was without error." That decision was rendered some thirty-two
years ago but if the defendant is still alive we will wager he has
never been convinced that the question of liability was not compromised by that jury. It would seem apparent on its face that a
verdict of $1 would in and of itself indicate a compromise as to
liability.
May we deviate here to illustrate the danger a defense attorney is confronted with under a case such as the one just cited?
The writer defended a dude rancher in a damage suit a few years
ago. Suit was for some $110,000. The rancher had only $5,000
insurance so that he was faced with possible bankruptcy in the
event of a large plaintiff's verdict. The injuries were very serious.
The plaintiff had sustained a fractured skull and some permanent
paralysis. The medical and hospital expense exceeded $6,000. After
8

McCarty-Johnson Heating & Engineering Co. v. Franbel, 70 Colo. 330, 201
Pac. 36 (1921).
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several hours' deliberation the jury returned a verdict for the
defendant. Upon questioning the jury we found that all members
of the jury were agreed that the defendant was not negligent but
two of the jurors wanted to return a verdict for $1 in favor of
the plaintiff so that the defendant's insurance company would pay
plaintiff's court costs. We shudder to think what might have happened if the other jurors had acceded to that suggestion. A new
trial on the issue of damages alone might well have been the result!
The next case follows the line of reasoning as followed in the
McCarty-Johnson case.9 In this case,' 0 several attorneys acting as
amici curiae attempted to get the court to change its views but of
no avail. In this case, the appellate court again approved the trial
court's granting of a new trial on the issue of damages alone
although admitting that there was "considerable dispute as to just
how the accident" occurred and in the face of affidavits from five
jurors to the effect that the "issues of liability and damages were
intertwined beyond the possibility of segregation." For authority
the court again relied upon Simmons v. Fish.
There is a very able dissenting opinion in the Belcaro case in
which the dissenting judge pointed out that the court had misapprehended the principle announced in Simmons v. Fish and that
in the Belcaro case it was indisputable that "the verdict was an
improper compromise between those convinced of liability and
those not so convinced." However, this dissent went the way of
all dissents.
The Belcaro case was decided in 1939. The question apparently did not again arise until about 1951 and 1952. In 1952 the
Colorado Supreme Court again considered the question; this time
as applied to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure which are practically identical with the Federal Rules. In a 1952 case," the court
failed to mention any of its prior decisions; stated that the application of rule 59 (a) was one of first impression and cited Norfolk
v. Southern Railroad Co., supra, as authority for granting a new
trial on the issues of damages alone. In a still later case 12 decided
June 8, 1953, the court has stated that they are not disposed to
depart from this rule of law. This apparently means that in any
case where the damages awarded a plaintiff are inadequate the
trial court can and should award a new trial on the issue of damages alone.
It appears to the writer that the reasoning of the courts in
many cases is fallacious. The courts go upon the assumption that
a jury first determines the issue as to liability and then considers
the amount of damages. Any trial attorney knows that it just does
not work that way. Jurors are not attorneys; they do not think
as attorneys do. While comparative negligence is not the law in
most of the states, jurors often apply it irrespective of the court's
9Supra, note 8.
I"Belcaro Realty Inv. Co. v. Norton, 103 Colo. 485; 87 P. (2d) 1114 (1939).
"Murrow v. Whiteley, 125 Colo. 392, 244 P. (2d) 657 (1952).
King v. Avila, 127 Colo. 538, 259 P. (2d) 268 (1953).
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instructions. They often take into consideration facts in mitigation of the damages. Further, jurors usually compromise their
differences and oftentimes this is reflected in the amount of the
damages awarded.
If the courts would follow the rules set out in Simmons v.
Fish 13 and Norfolk v. Southern Railroad Co.,' 4 we would have
nothing to complain of. Unfortunately, as pointed out, the tendency and trend is for the courts to assume that the issues of
liability and damages were separable in each case and to consistently award a new trial on the issue of damages alone.
It seems to us that the time has come to put a halt to this
abuse. How to effect this is a difficult question. Perhaps if enough
defense attorneys continually remind the courts of the sound rule
set forth in Simmons v. Fish and Norfolk v. Southern Railroad Co.,
some judge will see the light and start getting back on the right
track.
In the interim, the defense is still faced with the ever-present
problem of the jury compromising the verdict and putting the
defendant in the unfortunate position of being faced with a second trial on the issue of damages alone. How to avoid this is a
real problem. One suggestion would be special interrogatories thus
forcing the jury to make a specific finding on the question of liability. This is no solution, however, because it could still be a
compromise, but with the special finding as to liability the court
would have one more ground to insist that the questions of liability
and damages were clearly separated.
About the only practical solution is to argue most vociferously
to the jury for a defense verdict, but also point out to the jury
the amount you feel they should award the plaintiff in the event
they should decide to return a plaintiff's verdict. This suggested
amount should be the lowest amount counsel feels would stand up
as being adequate damages.
We are afraid that we are a voice crying in the wilderness.
However, if as a result of this article only one attorney is able
to convince only one court of the correct rule as respects new trials,
our effort has not been in vain. By this statement we do not wish
to infer that all Courts have been taking the wrong approach to
this problem. There is no question but what some of the Courts
do recognize the situation and have been quite careful in granting
new trials on the issue of damages alone. A very recent case in
that respect is one decided in August of 1952. This is the case of
Leipert v. Honold.1 5 In that case the appellate court recognized
the fact that the issue of liability was close and that where the
issue of liability was close and other circumstances would indicate
that the verdict was probably the result of prejudice, sympathy or
compromise, and that the issue of liability had not been actually
"See note 3.
' See note 4.
39 Cal. (2d) 462, 247 P. (2d) 334 (1952).
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determined, the new trial should be upon all issues and not on the
issue of damages alone. It is interesting to note in that case that
the Court took cognizance of the fact that the jury was out some
thirteen hours, and that "the long deliberation could not have been
caused by any dispute in regard to the nature and extent of Denny's
injuries."
The most recent annotation on this question will be found in
29 ALR (2d) 1199, where the annotator discusses the more recent
cases on this problem and points out the Courts who seem to have
"seen the light."
As previously pointed out, it seems to us ridiculous for Courts
to feel that in most cases when the damages awarded are inadequate that the jury has first determined the question of liability.
Certainly any intelligent juror who reads the Court's instructions
is not going to return a verdict for less than the actual damages,
if the jury has first conscientiously determined the defendant is
liable. It seems to us that all Courts should recognize that a verdict for the plaintiff for less than the actual proven damages indicates a compromise verdict or a verdict based upon sympathy, and
that if a new trial is to be granted it should be upon all issues.
While probably not coming under the main heading of our
article, we do not wish to close without mentioning briefly the fact
that there have been cases in which verdicts have been set aside
because of excessive awards. Probably the most recent of such
cases is that of Loftin v. Wilson." In that particular case the jury
award was for $300,000.
The appellate court set aside the case and ordered a new trial
on the issue of damages alone. The Court pointed out that the
actual pecuniary loss, including loss of future earnings, amounted
to approximately $92,000 and the balance of the jury award must
have been for pain and suffering which was entirely too much.
The Court in setting aside this verdict made the following interesting comment:
To what amount of damages is the plaintiff in this
case entitled? That is for a jury to decide, and not this
court. A jury decision in such a case must mean, however, a decision free from sentimental or emotional considerations. An appellate court may sanction a verdict
of a jury only when it has been reached by an unprejudiced and unimpassioned analysis of the evidence with a
conscious desire to apply the law in the case to the true
facts as shown by the evidence. Where a verdict is so
excessive as to indicate that other considerations have influenced the jury, justice has been thwarted and the verdict cannot be sanctioned.
The general rule among the courts seems to be that a trial
court should not interfere with a jury's verdict simply because it
"12 CCH Automobile Cases (2d)

134.
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is greater than its own estimate. That only where the verdict is
so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of the court, and
it is clearly manifest that it was a result of caprice, passion, partiality, prejudice, corrupt or other improper motives, will the
court intervene. In fact, the Federal Courts of Appeal have frequently invoked the rule that the question of excessiveness of damages being one of fact does not present a proper question for consideration
on review where the issues are confined to matters of
17
law.
For those who are interested in this problem of excessive verdicts, we call their attention to an annotation in 16 ALR (2d) 3.
It would appear that the general recognized rule is that the
amount of damages to be awarded for personal injuries is primarily a question of fact for decision by the jury and that the
Courts will interfere on the ground of excessiveness only in exceptional cases. The trend seems to be that large verdicts by
juries are generally not reversed by the appellate court, whereas
verdicts awarding inadequate damages are set aside and unfortunately new trials are too often awarded on the issue of damages
alone.
"Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Kelly, 131 Fed. (2d) 627 (1942).

ANNUAL LAW DAY
The University of Colorado Law School's
Annual Law Day program will be held on Saturday, April 24, 1954.
The subject of -the panel discussion in the
morning will be "Preparation and Trial of Tort
Actions." There will be a luncheon in connection
with the program at which Mr. S. Arthur Henry,
of the Denver Bar, will speak. At the evening
banquet Mr. Jean S. Breitenstein will make the
principal speech.
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CERTIFICATION OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
URGED
Certification of legal instruments by attorneys has received
the sanction of the Board of Trustees of the Denver Bar Association, acting upon the recommendation of its Unauthorized Practice committee headed by Wm. Rann Newcomb. This action was
taken in order to discourage the preparation of such documents
by laymen, encourage careful draftsmanship and make authorship
apparent on the face of the instrument for future consultation
or correction.
The board recommended that this certification be done by
means of a stamp reading:
"I certify that I drafted
this instrument.
Attorney at Law."
In order to encourage the use, and pass on savings in the
purchase of certification stamps, a quantity lot has been procured. These are now available at the Bar Association office, 702
Midland Savings Building, for $1.00 each.
The association took this step only after consultation with
other bar groups which have adopted the practice, and after securing a favorable opinion from the American Bar Association's
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances. It is contemplated primarily that such certification be placed on deeds, trust
deeds, releases, mortgages, notes, contracts of sale and other
instruments dealing with the transfer of real estate. However,
it is also recommended for wills, contracts and all other legal documents which an attorney may prepare for his client. In cases
of complicated contracts, which may be the product of two or
.more attorneys, there would be no necessity for its use, nor should
an attorney feel required to use it in any situation where he believes that its use may be a disservice to his client.
If used extensively by the attorneys of the state in connection with conveyancing, however, it could be a very important
first step in helping to prevent the preparation of such documents
by real estate brokers and others. The Unauthorized Practice committee is continuing to study ways and means of implementing
this entirely wholesome practice.
Notwithstanding other measures which may be taken, however, the use of the certification is important in itself, and in a
letter to all members of the Denver Bar Association, Mr. Newcomb stated, "There should be no delay in its enthusiastic and
wholehearted acceptance by the members of the bar. The use
of the stamp, of course, is purely voluntary. The success of the
practice, however, depends entirely upon you and the generality
with which it is used."
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INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS-FOURTH
STAGE IN COLORADO
VASCO G. SEAVY, JR.*

"There is no branch of the law of evidence in such inextricable
confusion as that relative to confessions." ' This famous quotation
by Chief Justice Sherwood of the Missouri Court was made over
four decades ago, but in a large degree still exists as a quasi-truth
in many of our jurisdictions.
The principal reason for the confusion in regard to the problem of involuntary confessions might be said to stem from our
appellate court's inability to weigh modern reason and logic on
the one hand, and adherence to ancient and technical rules on the
other. The history of the rule shows that the result has often been
an "exhibition of morbid sensibility toward criminals." 2
Professor Wigmore in his work on evidence 3 has separated
the problem into three distinct historical periods. The first existed up through the middle of the eighteenth century during which
time a confession, whether voluntary or involuntary, was regarded
as a "plea of guilt."

4

The second stage was evidenced during the

latter half of the eighteenth century when the problem was recognized, but only in so far as that it existed.5
In the early years of the nineteenth century, there was the
beginning of the so-called "modern rule." In this period all confessions were viewed with distrust.6 This stage reached its high
point in this country in 1897 when the United States Supreme
Court decided the Bram case 7 which will be discussed at a later
point.
Baron Parke summarized the third period in a statement made
in the case of Reg. v. Moore (1852).8 " * * * that if the threat
or inducement was held out, actually or constructively by a person
in authority, it cannot be received, however slight the threat or
inducement." The United States Supreme Court quoted with favor
the rule when deciding the Bram case, supra, and it was generally
held to be the existing law in all jurisdictions.'
It becomes clear by an examination of the test stated by Parke
that there was no logic nor reasonable basis for decisions involving
confessions during the period. The fourth stage can, therefore,
be defined as that period in which the appellate courts are to put
reason over technicality, logic over procedure, and modern public
* Student, University of Denver, College of Law.

'State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 695, 705 (1881).

'Queen

v. Johnston, 15 I.

'Wigmore

'Hale,
'Rudd's

C. L. 60.85.

on Evid., Vol. 3 (3rd Ed), sec. 817.

Pleas of the Crown, Emlyn's Ed. 225 (1680).
Case, 1 Leach Cr. C. 135, per Lord Mansfield (1775).

°Wigmore, op cit stipra, sec. 820.
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 204 (1897).
b2 Den. C. C., 522 (1852).
-Wigmore, sapra, sec. 825.
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policy over an adherence to ancient rules which have long ceased
to have any distinction other than age.
PURPOSE, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

The purpose of this article will be an attempt to show that
Colorado has reached this stage of "modern reason" in connection
with the problem of confessions. The general rules for the exclusion will be helpful to clarify the problem. So also will a short
discussion of the United States Supreme Court cases help to show
by contrast the period of enlightenment into which our Colorado
Court has entered.
It will be necessary to limit the scope of the problem to those
matters related to the admission of confessions, i.e., in determining whether they are voluntary or involuntary. The scope will
be further limited to those confessions which are "extra-judicial"
in nature, and which are induced in one form or another by law
enforcement officers acting in their capacity of crime detection.
"A confession is an acknowledgment by an accused in a criminal case of his guilt of the crime charged." 10 Therefore, any statement which would be exculpatory or an exoneration would not be
classified as a confession.' 1
Chamberlayne 12 has given five requisites enabling an extra
judicial confession to be admitted into evidence: (1) a declaration
by one accused of the crime involved in the proceedings, (2) incriminatory, (3) certain, (4) complete, and (5) voluntary. It is
the last problem with which we are here confronted.
It is extremely difficult to define the word voluntary as used
in this sense. A definition was attempted in the Colorado case of
Tuttle v. The People wherein the court stated that the confession
must proceed "from the spontaneous suggestion of the party's own
mind." 13 But Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court,
in an able dissenting opinion in the Ashcroft case,1 4 said in effect
that every confession made in response to questions by law enforcement officers was induced in some degree. Thus, it is the
degree of the inducement, in connection with its effect,15 which is
the test of voluntariness, and not the inducement standing alone.
PRINCIPLES OF EXCLUSION

There is no doubt but that modern day police practices warrant a close inspection of every confession claimed to be made
under duress. Wharton 16 once stated that the inquisition practices
of the twentieth century were so related to those of the sixteenth
century, that the Colorado legislature made it a felony to induce
"22 C.J.S., p. '1420.
,Walker v. The People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P. (2d)

287 (1952).

Mora v. The People, 19 Colo. 255, 35 P. 179 (1893).
' Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evidence, Vol. 2, sec. 1473.
"33 Colo. 243, 79 P. 330 (1905).
"Ashcraft

v. Tenn., 320 U.S. 728, 64 S.Ct. 94, 88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944).

"Osborn v. The People, 262 U. S. 892 (1927).
"Wharton,

Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2 (10th Ed.), see. 622f.
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17
This law still
confessions either by mental or physical duress.
remains in Colorado."' An examination of the "Wickersham Report" 19 made in 1931 discloses many incidents of actual police
brutality in this respect. So also in the last decade have many
cases 20 appeared before the United States Supreme Court where
devices used to obtain confessions have a striking similarity to
those used in the medieval periods.
The problem, therefore, certainly cannot be considered as
having no bearing on modern jurisprudence.
Criticisms of the modern view in regard to the exclusion of
confessions are prevalent and in the most part justified. There
are many different views concerning the value of confessions ranging from a statement by a South Carolina Court that a confession
is "in most cases the highest evidence that can be given." 21 to
Blackstone's remark that it "is the weakest and most suspicious
of all testimony." 22 It becomes clear then, why there is so much
confusion in regard to the entire doctrine of confessions when
their value is regarded with such contrast. Where confusion is
present, justified criticisms are only one step behind.
The basic criticism is, of course, that the rule of exclusion,
when based on grounds of the law of evidence, is illogical. It is
difficult to find a logical ground upon which an involuntary confession is to be excluded. One writer has commented "that a person should falsely accuse himself of having been guilty of a serious
crime may seem grossly improbable." 23 Certainly the duress would
have to be very great before one of strong constitution and reasonable intelligence would falsely confess to a crime which possibly
would result in his execution.
Nevertheless, it is agreed by most authorities that the underlying principle of exclusion is the untrustworthiness of the evidence.2 4 But the difficulty with this theory is that few courts are
willing to examine all the surrounding conditions of the induced
confession to see if the inducement actually had the effect of compelling the particular defendant to confess falsely. The Colorado
Court has held that "it is no answer to say we cannot explore the
human mind. ' 2 5 Perhaps if all courts would take this approach the
doctrine of untrustworthiness would be a reality and not a mere
legal fiction in answer to a difficult problem.
Actually the reason for excluding involuntary confessions is
found in the ancient principle, emanating from the common law

"Colo. Laws, c. 195, p. 468 (1909).
"8Colo. Stat. Ann., c. 48, sec. 153 (1935).
"Nat'l Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.
(1931) Report No. 11, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement.
See ante, Supreme Court Cases.
-Columbia v. Harrison, 2 Mills Const. (S.C.) 215 (1818).
2-4 Black Comm. 357.
Chamberlayne, supra. sec. 1591.
'420 American Jurisprudence, 422, sec. 483.
Chamberlayne, supra, sec. 1481.
Wharton, supra. sec. 622e.
"Osborn v. The People, supra.
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and fixed in most state constitutions, that no one can be forced
to incriminate himself.2 11, If the problem were always explained
on this basis no attempt would be necessary to justify the rule
under some principle of evidence.
Under the Constitution of the United States, the Federal
Courts -are bound under the self incrimination clause 7 in like
manner as are the states under their respective constitutions. So
also may a constitutional basis be found for the rule when a state
case goes to the United States Supreme Court via the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is, of course, more difficult for that court to find
reversible error in alleged involuntary confessions under the Fourteenth Amendment than under the Fifth Amendment, when the
case comes from a lower Federal Court. But regardless of where
the constitutional safeguards are found, they are present and
should be used as the basis for exclusion.
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

Before going into the Colorado cases, it is interesting to note
the confusion which exists in the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. It appears that the Court is in each case seeking
to promulgate a definite standard or a technical rule under which
the problem may be simplified. The result, as an examination of
a few cases will show, has only led to inconsistency and, consequently, confusion.
Bram v. United States 28 was decided by that Court in 1897.
The facts were, briefly, that an officer of a ship was accused of
murdering the captain, put ashore in irons at Halifax, accused of
the crime and asked to confess by a law enforcement officer, subsequently confessed; and then returned to the United States where
he was convicted. In the interrogation by the police officer, there
were no threats, no abuses, no prolonged questions, but merely an
accusation and a request for a confession. This said the Court,
"must have created an impression of hope, or of fear in remaining
silent," and consequently the confession was held to be improperly
induced. Wigmore cites the case 2as
the most unreasonable perpetu9
ation of inappropriate doctrines.
It is necessary to skip almost one half century to bring the
present day rules into focus. The Court was first confronted with
the problem arising in a State Court in the case of Brown v. Mississippi.30 This case may be categorized with three other cases:
Chambers v. Florida,3' White v. Texas, 32 and Ward v. Texas.33 In
each of the four cases there were negroes involved; each case
arose in the Southern section, and each was reversed on the grounds
SColo. Const., Ar. IV, sec. 18.
United States Const., Amend. V.
'168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 204 (1897).
'Wigmore, sapra, p. 355.
297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936).
"309 U.S. 227. 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940).
.2 310 U.S. 530, 60 S.Ct. 1032, 84 L. Ed. 1342 (1940).
3 316 U.S. 547, 62 S.Ct. 1139, 86 L. Ed. 1663 (1942).
-
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of involuntary confessions failing to meet the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In these cases, there can be no doubt
but that any reasonable court would have acted as did the Supreme
Court in reversing. The brutality involved gives weight to Wharton's statement as to the close relationship
of the sixteenth and
3 4
twentieth century inquisition practices.
But in 1943 came the famous McNabb case,"5 coming to the
Supreme Court via the lower Federal Courts. Mr. Justice Frankfurter therein laid down the "civilized standard" rule of exclusion, which was based upon the failure to take the defendant before a committing magistrate. Can any more logical grounds be
found for labelling a confession involuntary when the accused was
not immediately taken before a magistrate than when he is accused
and asked to confess as in the Bram case?
Nor was the Supreme Court satisfied with this "civilized
standard," for in 1944 that Court decided the case of Ashcraft v.
Tennessee." Here the Court devised another standard, that of
"inherent coercion." This was based upon thirty-six hours of
questioning the accused. Justice Jackson in his able dissent asked
the pertinent question, that if time were to be used as the standard, where was the line to be drawn? It is interesting to note here
that only three years prior to the Ashcraft case the same Court
could find no "inherent coercion" in forty two hours of no sleep
and continued questioning, but preferred to rest on the basis of
a state's
sovereignty necessitating a "plain abuse" of Federal
37
right.
These few cases illustrate the difficulty of the courts when
confronted with the problem of confessions to advance from
out-moded and inadequate standards to a position of realistic
approach to an involved question.
The problem will be greatly simplified when the United States
Supreme Court clarifies its position, for the influence of that
8
event upon the state courts could not be over-estimated..
COLORADO CASES

There have been three outstanding Colorado cases reversed
due to an involuntary confession being admitted as evidence.3 9
In Beery v. United States, decided in 1873, the court followed
the rule of the period and found that a slight chance of hope in
promises made was sufficient to render the confession involuntary.
At that time there was a strong dissent labelling the opinion of
Supra, note 16.
* McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943).
'320 U.S. 728, 64 S.Ct. 94, 88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944).
"Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 68 S.Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166 (1941).
"For an examination of the Supreme Court cases see Inbau, "Confession
Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court," 43 Ill. L. R. 442.
McCormick, "Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of
Confessions," 24 Tex. L. R. 239.
Bruner v. The People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P. (2d) 111 (1945);
Beery v. United States, 2 Colo. 183 (1873);
Read v. The People, 122 Colo. 308, 221 P. (2d) 1070 (1950).
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the majority one of the "venerable errors abounding in the law
* * * respectable only for their antiquity." 40
The second of the three, Bruner v. The People, is a clear case
of abuse by police officers. The defendant was questioned for fifteen hours, threatened throughout, denied food and rest, and denied
the satisfaction of the calls of nature. The Court found that the
defendant was justified in believing that such treatment would
continue until he confessed.
In the last case, Read v. The People, the defendant was in
such a state of mental depravity when she was being questioned
that there was no doubt of her inability to have the mental capacity
to render a voluntary confession. The state of mind was not caused
by any duress stemming from police officers, but existed due to
extraneous circumstances.
These cases illustrate the point that the Court will, when
necessary, declare a confession to be involuntary, but that there
must be clear and convincing proof of the causal relationship between the inducement or mental incapacity and the confession.
So also do the three cases illustrate three separate problems under
the confession dilemma.
The Beery case comes under the heading of those inducements tending to incite hope, fear, or some other state of mind
which would render the confession invalid when made thereto.
The Bruner case is illustrative of actual physical abuse, and the
Read case shows a state of mental incapacity rendering the confession "involuntary."
THE OSBORN CASE

The entire confession doctrine is discussed in the case of
Osborn v. The People, supra. This case should be discussed before
going any further. Its importance in this respect cannot be overestimated. The case, standing alone, is sufficient evidence of Colorado's enlightenment.
The defendants, Osborn and Noakes, were convicted of first
degree murder. One of the defendants was brought to Denver
and his treatment, while then incarcerated, was the basis for the
involuntary contention.
The defendant had been placed in jail on a Saturday where
he remained until Monday at which time he was brought before
the Chief of Police. The defendant was questioned for short intervals throughout the day, and during the intermissions of the
questioning was placed into what was known as the "hole.' He
went without lunch during the day, and late in the afternoon
confessed.
The other defendant claimed that, because during the time
that he was being driven to Denver certain statements referring
to "neck cracking" were made to him by the Chief of Police, his
subsequent confession was made involuntarily.
per Wells, Justice.

DICTA

April, 1954

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the trial court in
a decision written by Mr. Justice Butler. The entire history of
confessions was discussed, the Court recognizing the limitations
of the value of the rule and conceding the inadequacy of the courts
in handling the problem. The Court mentions in this respect the
case of Beery v. United States, supra, and while not specifically
overruling the case, it cites authorities who have agreed with the
dissenter, Mr. Justice Wells, and intimates that
there would be
41
no reason to perpetuate the rule of that case.
The Court in deciding the case, settled certain points in connection with the confession doctrine which have since become
established principles in this jurisdiction. The most important of
these should be enumerated and commented upon.
First, and most important, there must be a cause and effect
relationship between the inducement and the confession. 42 Therefore, not every abuse rendered the defendant no matter how
slight will suffice to invalidate a subsequent confession. If the
abuse did in fact cause the defendant to confess, the confession
will be deemed involuntary. But, on the other hand, if the confession-was made due to some reason other than the inducement,
the inducement has no effect on its voluntariness.
Second, the appellate court may "look into the mind" of the
defendant to see if the inducements actually caused the confession.
This, of course, is the method of arriving at the cause and effect
rule set out above. This point is evidence of the Court's refusal
to promulgate any technical rule under which to determine the
validity of a confession. It does signify, however, the principle
that each case shall be determined upon its own merits.
Third, the question of admissibility is one for the court. This
is very important, as the matter is one of law and as such should
not be left for the determination of the jury. Wigmore believes
that the practice in some jurisdictions of allowing the jury to43
rule upon the question of admissibility is nothing short of heresy.
Fourth, the function of the jury is to determine the weight
to be given the confession. Of course, the jury may give the confession no weight at all if it determines that it was made under
duress, but this is 'a proper function of the jury as there is no
difference in the type of evidence produced by an admitted confession from any other properly admitted evidence left for the determination of the jury.
Fifth, the trial court's finding based upon conflicting evidence
cannot be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.
Obviously, the trial court is in a better position to weigh the
conflicting evidence before it to determine this point than is the
appellate court which has before it only the printed record of the
proceedings. This rule has been rigidly adhered to in this jurisdic" Osborn v. The People, supra, p. 28.
12Ibid, p. 37.
:,Wigniore, supr(,

see, 961.
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is a lack of contion and is one of the main reasons why there
44
fusion in regard to confessions in Colorado.
Here then is the law of confessions. Admittedly, if threats,
torture, hope, fear, or any other extraneous force did "in fact"
cause the accused to confess, the confession is involuntary. But
the inducements must cause the confession. Mere facts of statements to the effect of "neck cracking," the placing in a "hole,"
the deprivation of lunch, the accusations, the advice to tell the
truth, the solitary confinement, and the intermittent questioning
while under arrest, are not sufficient, standing alone, to render a
subsequent confession involuntary.
There is, however, one criticism which may be made of the
Osborn case. On page 27, the Court quotes from Wigmore that
"the policy of the future * * * should be to receive all well
proved confessions in evidence, and leave them to the jury subject
to all discrediting circumstances, to receive such weight as may
seem proper." 45 The Court states that it has not yet reached that
stage. May it never. The constitutional immunity from self incrimination should never be left to a jury's deliberation. It is 0
matter of law, and as such, should remain with the court's superior
wisdom. A quotation from Mr. Justice Burke's dissenting opinion
in the O'Loughlin case is well taken: "It has been too many centuries, too much blood, and too many hard won constitutions, to
insure men and women fair and impartial trials and freedom from
threat of convictions obtained by confessions extorted by torture,
to permit these rights to be now prejudiced by hasty action." 4,
GENERAL RULES IN COLORADO

Although it is difficult to find in Colorado case law many specific incidents governing the law of admissibility of confessions,
due in the main to the Court's adherence to the rule of the necessity of finding an abuse of discretion in the trial court,4' there are,
however, certain rules pertaining to confessions which should be
noted.
1. All surrounding circumstances in regard to the making
of the confession should be taken irIto consideration by the trial
court in determining its validity.48 This includes the age, maturity,
intelligence, and character of the defendant, plus the circumstances
surrounding the confinement.
" See note 47 ante.
Wigmore, supra, sec. 867.
"O'Loughlin v. The People, 90 Colo. 368, 400, 10 P. (2d) 543 (1932).
17 Osborn v. The People, supra.
Moss v. The People, 92 Colo. 88, 18 P. (2d) 316 (1932).
Bosko v. The People, 68 Colo. 257, 188 P. 743 (1920).
Moya v. The People, 88 Colo. 139, 293 P. 235 (1930).
Fincher v. The People, 26 Colo. 169, 56 P. 902 (1899).
Saiz v. The People, 93 Colo. 291, 25 P. (2d) 1114 (1933).
Goodfellow v. The People, 75 Colo. 243, 224 P. 1051 (1924).
18Read v. The People, supra.
Osborn v. The People, supra.
Ingles v. The People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P. (2d) 1109 (1933).
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2. The Court has decided that certain contentions made by
the defense are not sufficient to render a confession involuntary.
An example is that mere failure to warn the defendant that his
statement might be used against him does not render an otherwise
49
Nor will a confession be
voluntary confession involuntary.
in bringing the accused before
a
delay
to
due
deemed involuntary
the
a committing magistrate,--, nor using abusive language during
2
interrogation,' nor inducing a confession by trick of fraud.
3. Mental capacity is always a question involved in the law
at
of admissibility of confessions. If the defendant was asleep
5:
the time of making the confession, it should be excluded, ' and if
there is any doubt as to whether the accused was asleep when the
alleged confession was made, the question should be left to the
jury. 4 As to intoxication, the question is one of degree. If there
is mental capacity sufficient to realize what one is saying, intoxication is of no consequence.55
4. In regard to procedure, it has been held that failure to
observe procedural requirements of the general rule is not fatal
when there is no prejudice., G In this respect, the Court has held
that it is not reversible error when the trial court fails to conduct
a preliminary hearing without the presence of the jury when the
confession is in fact voluntary.5 Nor will remarks made by the
prosecution in reference to the confession before there is a preliminary hearing invalidate a confession which is subsequently
shown to be voluntary. 58 But it is reversible error for the trial
judge to comment upon the weight which the jury is to attach to
the confession.5 9
5. In the determination of the validity of a confession the
Supreme Court has held that an involuntary confession will have
no effect when there has been a subsequent voluntary confession
made.6 0 A confession will be deemed voluntary when it is substantiated upon cross-examination, 1 and if there is evidence
49Cahill v. The People, 111 Colo. 29, 137 P. (2d) 673 (1943).
Reagan v. The People, 49 Colo. 316, 112 P. 785 (1910).
Byram v. The People, 49 Colo. 533, 113 P. 528 (1911).
"Cahill v. The People, supra.
51Buschy v. The People, 73 Colo. 472, 216 P. 519 (1923).
Downey v. The People, 121 Colo. 307, 215 P. (2d) 892 (1950).
5- Osborn v. The People. sitpra.
B'Martinez v. The People, 55 Colo. 51, 132 P. 64 (1913).
Taylor v. The People, 77 Colo. 350, 237 P. 159 (1925).
Martinez v. The People, su pra.
Roper v. The People, 116 Colo. 493, 179 P. (2d) 232 (1947).
Roper v. The People, supra.
Andrews v. The People, 33 Colo. 193, 79 P. 1031 (1905).
' Cahill v. The People, supra.
Mitsunaga v. The People, 54 Colo. 102, 129 P. 241 (1912).
Reagan v. The People, su!pra.
Fincher v. The People, supra.
"Roper v. The People, supra.
"Honda v. The People, 111 Colo. 279, 141 P. (2d) 178 (1943).
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which supports a recital of voluntariness incorporated
within
2
the confession it will be determined voluntary."
When the evidence supports the trial court's finding, the appellate court cannot determine the confession to be involuntary,
for obviously there has been no abuse of discretion."3 Evidence by
the defendant tending to show threats or abuses after the confession was made is clearly inadmissible,"4 and in like manner is
evidence showing abuse when there is no attempt by the People
to introduce into the record a confession.",
By an examination of the foregoing rules, and of the Osborn
case, it becomes clear that the Colorado Court has reached an
advanced stage in treating confessions. It is a stage of reason
and realism. There is no attempt to promulgate any inflexible
rule.6 There is no attempt to protect the criminal at the expense
of public welfare. There is no evidence of Wigmore's statement
that the only ones who seem to be unaware 7 of the necessities of
police detection are Supreme Court Justices."
CONCLUSION

Professor Wigmore cites three possibilities which would help
eliminate the problem."8 The first is to let an authorized, skilled,
magistrate take the confession. In many outlying districts where
crimes are, unfortunately, also committed, this would be virtually
impossible. As far as experts are concerned, witness the Bruner
case, supra.
The second suggestion is to make a moving picture of the proceedings. Apart from the cost element, this suggestion when
analyzed nears the sublime.
The third suggestion is to let the bench and bar "rigorously
expose and suppress the brutal methods." This is a self-evident
truth, for no member of a learned and ethical profession would
be justified in following any other course.
If and when the practice of regarding confessions with the
realistic and enlightened approach of the Colorado Court is followed throughout the common law justidictions, there will no
longer be the necessity of seeking for answers to a problem which
may be solved by mere reasonableness.
"Pearson v. The People, 69 Colo. 76, 168 P. 655 (1917).
O'Donnel v. The People, 71 Colo. 113, 204 P. 330 (1922).
Fincher v. The People, supra.
Bosko v. The People, supra.
,Kolenberger v. The People, 9 Colo. 233, 11 P. 101 (1886).
Brindisi v. The People, 76 Colo. 244, 230 P. 797 (1924).
'Frady v. The People, 96 Colo. 43, 40 P. 606 (1934).
wReagan v. The People, supra.
O'Wigmore, supra, sec. 851.
"Wigmore, su pra, sec. 851.
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HOW SOME LAWYERS HAVE INCREASED
THEIR LAW OFFICE INCOME*
PAUL CARRINGTON of the Dallas Bar

There has been no sham in my hesitancy as a lawyer froii
the distant Southwest in presuming to suggest to New York lawyers how they might increase their average charges to clients. But
these same observations, with varying emphases, have been presented in articles and books and speeches of others; and, as on
other recent occasions, I am willing to repeat these observations
again and yet again in the hope that self-analyses by lawyers as
to their fees and their office practices relating to their fees will
be encouraged.
At the midwinter meeting of the Wisconsin Bar Association
last February, I presented these views and at that time presented
to those present a brief bibliography so that any of them who
wished to do so, could study his own problems more carefully and
in more detail by reading the articles and books that I recommended. A copy of that bibliography is appended at the bottom
of this article. Let me urge all who read this article to reach his
own conclusions based upon such a study of the more complete
material available rather than based upon the terse summaries of
some of the data that I present here.
The Wisconsin Bar Association has since placed in the hands
of each of its members a four page outline by which every lawyer
can more readily calculate what his average charge per hour of
professional service should be, that figure being the basic point of
departure which as a matter of common sense he must know be-.
fore determining to what extent circumstances involving any specific charge he is making, should be at a higher or lower rate of
compensation. At my request the Wisconsin outline has been presented to you immediately following this article.
In order to emphasize my points I desire first to present, in
brief tabular form, some statistics from the latest decennial census of the federal government:
The mean average net income by size of the city or town in
which the physician or lawyer is located, of those whose major
income came from independent practice, in 1949:
Population
Physicians
Under 1,000 --------.............. $ 7,109
1,000 to .2,499 --------------------_---- 8,732
2,500 to
4,999 ....................... 11,228
5,000 to
9,999 ................... 11,624
10,000 to 24,999 ...................... 12,134
25,000 to 49,999 ...................... 12,812
50,000 to 99,999 ------------------------ 13,186

Lawyers
$ 3,694
4,708
5,060
5,516
6,350
6,236
8,501

*Reprinted from the New York State Bar Bulletin for February, 1954.
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to 249,999 ---------------------------13,110
7,332
to 499,999 ........................
14,276
'8,348
to 999,999 ------------------..........
13,161
10,057
and over -------------------- _ ----10,661
10,625

These figures are after increases in average net income, 1949
over 1929:

For all U. S. earners -----------------...........-----------------109%
For all U. S. unsalaried physicians ----------------------- 125%
For all U. S. unsalaried lawyers --------------------------46%
In fact, the decreases for the first of these two decades for physicians and lawyers have been more than offset during the second
decade.
The average annual income for each year stated, was:
Year
All Physicians All Lawyers
1 9 2 9 -------------------------------------------------$ 5 ,2 2 4
$ 5 ,5 3 4
1941 ---------------------------------------------4,441
4,507
1947

---------------------------------------------- 11,058

1951

---------------------------------------------13,432
8,730

7,532

The percentage of increase of the number of physicians and the
number of lawyers during the last ten year period is much less
than during the twenty year period. During the 1939-49 decade,
our increase in population nationally was 14.5%, of physicians
15.2%, of lawyers 11.1%. As a profession we are attracting young
men at less than the national rate of growth. As a profession we
are sharing per lawyer, on an average, less of the increasing national income. And yet our friends the physicians have gained
greatly, especially in the last decade; they have capitalized on, as
the individual physician has made use of, the superior facilities
of his professional organizations for economic as well as professional research.
To my mind, the most important single lesson which the
lawyers of America can learn from the economic studies of our
profession that have recently been made as a part of the Survey
of the Legal Profession, is graphically presented in a brief table
showing the extent to which American non-salaried lawyers in
1949 were practicing alone and the financial penalty, on the average, that each such lawyer paid for his independence from partners:
Practicing solo ------............---------------73.6%
$ 5,759
As member of a firm of two -------- 14.8%
8,030
As member of a firm of three -----4.9%
12,821
As member of a firm of four ----------- 2.1%
16,614
As member of a firm of from five
20,467
-------- 3.4%
to eight ---------------------------As member of a firm of nine or
27,246
1.3%
more --------------------.---------------------
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One of every seven physicians in America in 1949 practiced
in a partnership with two or more in the firm. The average net
income of that one physician in a partnership with one or more
partners was $17,772. The average net income of the other six
physicians without a partner was $10,895.
From these statistics no one should attempt to reach a quick
conclusion as applicable to himself. The proper answer for each
individual lawyer is not based primarily on statistics. But the
trends, of which we have all been doubtless aware, without statistical support of our views, seem doubly clear:
That physicians are making more than lawyers. One important reason for this, in my opinion, is that the physicians
are better advised on the economics of their profession and
because, accordingly, on an average, they bill their patients
more regularly, more promptly and more surely in relation
to the time and effort devoted by them to the service rendered.
That physicians and lawyers make more money net from
their practice when located in larger towns and in cities. But
these differences seem to me in all probability to be offset, or
at least largely so, by differences in costs of living in their
respective communities.
That far greater differences in income of physicians and
of lawyer are attributable to the decision whether to practice
alone or with partner or partners.
It has amazed me to examine the statistics as to the proclivities of lawyers in various states for entering into partnerships. In
New York and in New York City, in particular, the percentage
of non-salaried lawyers not a member of any partnership is higher
than the national average. The state where there are proportionately more partners in the practice of law'than any other is Iowa.
That state, Louisiana, Kansas and Arizona are the only states that
have more than thirty-five per cent of their non-salaried lawyers
practicing with partners. Eleven more states have more than
thirty per cent practicing non-salaried lawyers practicing with
partners, and one of these is Texas. Though Texans generally bear
a reputation of being independently-minded and I would have
guessed before reading the statistics that the percentage of lawyers practicing law solo in Texas would be higher than in New
York, the opposite is true.
ADVANTAGES OF A PARTNERSHIP

Of course, there are many advantages other than financial
that a lawyer may gain in having at least one partner. If the advantage were solely financial it would seem to be of less importance to the rest of us practicing law and that all of us might well
feel that each lawyer should be urged to make his own decision
freely.
But in my opinion the quality of service that a partnership of
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two lawyers can render to its clients is superior to the quality of
service that can be rendered to his clients by either of the partners.
If this be true, all of us as lawyers desirous of improving the
reputation of our profession for service, has an interest in reducing
the percentage of solo practitioners in the law.
Of course the occasions are frequent where two heads are
better than one. The background of two partners of varying experience and different attitudes and different approaches to the
same problems, time and time again demonstrates this very important fact.
Even in the simplest of offices, a fair and equitable division
of work often involves one partner usually taking all or most of
one type of work in the office and another partner taking all or
most of another type of work. Even in a two-man office there is
some tendency toward that division of work which will give to
the firm the benefit of the repetitive experience in that type of
work of the one rendering the service. The law is so complex and
has so many fields where proficient lawyers now are specializing,
that it is extremely difficult for the solo practitioner to keep up
in every field and to advise his clients on any subject without research applicable to that client alone. The lawyer who can handle
recurrent problems of the same type from time to time has an
advantage over the lawyer who cannot do that.
Teamwork always inspires best efforts.
The ability for handling legal matters for clients more promptly and in a more orderly fashion certainly can be achieved to a
greater extent in a two-lawyer office than by the solo practitioner.
All other work of a solo practitioner suffers during periods when
he is engaged in trial of one lawsuit or in monopolizing preparation
therefor; during his absences from his practice on vacations or
on account of illness or for attendance at bar meetings or other
reasons. When he has an immediate emergency for each of two
clients, each requiring exclusive attention to his emergency, the
solo practitioner is faced with a dilemma that requires him to
choose to serve one to the exclusion of the other. Conceding that
in any partnership, such interruptions in the service by the partner whose service the client primarily expects, will involve some
delays and some inconveniences to the client as well as to the firm,
it would seem very clear that in a two-partner firm these causes
for delay so often irksome to a client are greatly reduced.
Of course, the disadvantages of becoming a partner in the
practice of law with another lawyer, are dependent upon the professional abilities of the two and their personal characteristics.
The disadvantages may well outweigh the advantages. But where
one professionally able to carry his share of the work and to do
it well can be found, the disadvantages would seem clearly to be
outweighed. I am told that there has been widespread reluctance
by individual lawyers as to law partnerships because of the general feeling that if one has a partner he should be an equal partner.
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Equality in experience, proficiency, productivity and resulting income for the firm is seldom achieved. Frequently partnerships are
equal because of the reluctance of both partners to consider bases
for inequality that can be readily computed and when computed
readily agreed upon by them both.
THE IMPORTANCE OF DAILY RECORDS

It is for this reason above all others, that I want to urge upon
all lawyers who will do so, that they keep a daily and accurate list
of all professional services rendered and of the time devoted to
each. Daily time sheets can be, and as I see it, in their best form
are very simple. With such a record what has been done for every
client by each partner is clearly recorded and the one who later
drafts the bill to be submitted to the client cannot unintentionally
overlook what his partner has done, or by forgetfulness minimize
what he himself has done. My own experience and the experience
of many others with whom I have discussed the matter, demonstrate that any statement prepared by a solo practitioner or by
a partner who alone has devoted time and effort to the service
covered by a bill that is being drafted who does not have access
to such a record of what has been done and when, and at what
effort, more frequently than not is too low, for the attorneys are
prone to underestimate their own time and effort. This is especially true, if the bill relates to services not rendered during the
month then current but over a period of months.
Moreover, small matters quickly completed and closed are frequently overlooked by the practitioner who has not made a record
of his time devoted to them. The client who has called upon an
attorney for a service promptly performed expected to pay a fee
for that service, doubtless. The physician who keeps a record of
every call at the office or on the patient or by phone and who makes
a charge for every call does not overlook the relatively unimportant services that he has rendered. The lawyer who keeps no systematic record of how he has devoted his time proverbially does.
If the client to whom no bill is sent is a new client, he may
well consider that the lawyer who does not bill him because of the
lawyer's oversight did not appreciate the employment. Any client
overlooked in the rendition of a bill or otherwise is prone to seek
his professional service elsewhere.
Many fee charges of many lawyers are contractual and the
service rendered under the contract will be paid at the contractual
rate whether the time record is preserved or not. But in such
matters, to, it is equally imperative that the time record be preserved and analyzed and that it be determined in the light of that
analysis whether the employment was profitable or unprofitable.
How otherwise can a lawyer intelligently ask for an increase in
a retainer or an increase in a daily charge for particular services
such as a day in court?
As a basis, therefore, for a consideration of what fees shall
be charged and how much should be charged on each matter, I

DICTA

April, 1954

want to urge that every lawyer, the solo practitioner and those
with partners, should maintain a record of what he does and for
whom from day to day. Analysis and summaries of these day to
day records can be made for the lawyer by an office secretary or
clerk. Some such analyses and the statistics from them become
complicated in larger firms. This need not be so. For as the basis
for departure, from which every fee to be charged will be increased
or decreased as other circumstances may justify, at least a total
of time devoted by every lawyer in the office to the matter for
which the bill is submitted should be prepared and carefully considered.
This perhaps is being done in New York to a greater extent
than I assume. But in 1949 I made a survey of the practices of
every law firm in Texas in which seven or more lawyers were employed, including partners and associates. Of the thirty-two Texas
firms whose practices as to daily time sheets were then considered,
I was surprised and disappointed to find that there were only nine
who kept a systematic record. There are over twenty now. I have
been informed by attorneys who are conversant with the practices
of lawyers generally in various states that there has been a subtantial increase in the last four or five years in the number of
lawyers practicing solo or in firms who are now keeping systematic
time records, comparable to the increase of that practice among
the Texas firms just referred to. My guess is that there has been
such an increase, or perhaps a greater one, in New York in recent
years; but that among solo practitioners, especially, there is a
crying need for better system.
The lawyer who practices solo or in partnership who does not
keep such a record simply is missing one of his largest factors of
public relations with reference to demonstrating to his clients the
reasonableness of his charges whenever occasion for discussion
of any fee as charged does arise. A client that believes his lawyer
picked the fee that he is charged out of the air is an unhappy
client. Of course there are exceptions. Of course I am not advocating that all lawyers go on a time basis and charge so much a
minute or so much an hour or adopt any other standard applicable
to every situation. But I am advocating that every lawyer keep
a record of how mrany hours or parts of hours were devoted to
each professional service that he renders every day and that the
lawyer who dictates the bill for that service know what service
has been rendered and at what expense in time of what, lawyer
or lawyers (and hence necessarily of overhead) has been involved
in the service rendered before he determines the amount to be
charged. Then he can demonstrate to the client what the service
was from the standpoint of that which the lawyer has chiefly to
sell-his time in the light of his professional experience and
training.
The four page circular of the Wisconsin Bar above mentioned
suggested a method for using the summaries prepared from daily
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time sheets. Other valuable suggestions are to be found in the
available literature on the subject referred to in the bibliography
at the end of this article. Practices and policies reasonably differ
depending on many differing circumstances. In the light of suggestions showing what others are doing, each lawyer can readily
determine for himself how best to use his time records and, of
course, during the first year or so of their use may readily find by
trial-and-error methods how to improve that use.
Rather than to discuss any such detail I am limiting this paper
to a discussion of the single point that every lawyer, in his own
way and for his own protection against his own forgetfulness and
errors of judgment as to how much time and effort he or others
in his office have devoted to a service, really must maintain a systematic time record. A necessary corollary to this is that every
lawyer with a partner will find it much easier to convince himself
that the daily chore of preparing the time record each day while
every matter is fresh on his mind is an important one, than will
the lawyer who practices solo. This is another and an important
reason why the same man with a partner will probably make more
money quite properly and justifiably and quite fairly to every client
than he will if practicing alone.
Lawyers who are not making daily time records and preserving and analyzing them, are ignoring essential financial aspects
of their own practice. This, it seems to me, is made clear by the
statistics quoted in this article.
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LAWYERS' INCOMES
The United States Department of Labor in 1951 issued its
bulletin No. 998 entitled "Occupational Outlook Handbook" and
some of the interebting information contained therein is as follows:
The number of lawyers and judges in the United States in
late 1944 was roughly estimated at 200,000 including more than
4,000 women. About two-thirds of these lawyers, according to
the 1947 survey, derived most of their professional income from
independent practice either by themselves or, less often, with partners. The remainder depend on salaried positions with other lawyers, banks, labor unions, government agencies and etc. A considerable number combine both salaried and independent practice,
while others do legal work on a part time basis in connection with
real estate or insurance.
In mid-1950 the legal profession was overcrowded, and appeared likely to remain so during the next few years. It was conservatively estimated that about 12,000 young lawyers passed the
bar examinations during 1949, and this is an all-time peak, close
to twice as many as in the years just before World War II. From
4,000 to 5,000 lawyers a year are eliminated from the profession
by death or retirement. The article also states that the tendency
toward overcrowding in the profession will probably continue,
however, unless ways are found to make legal services available
to greater numbers of middle and lower income people. Opportunities for specialists are often better than for lawyers in general
practice; many of the larger law firms have such specialists. Specialties with relatively good prospects in the long run are tax law,
patent law, administrative law and etc. The best opportunities
for lawyers usually lie in medium-size and smaller cities, especially
those with prospects of economic expansion.
According to a survey made by the United States Department
of Commerce, lawyers in independent practice had a median net
income of about $5,700.00 in 1948 which was nearly twice as much
as in 1941. Incomes tended to be much higher in large than in
small communities. Independent lawyers in places of under 1,000
population had a median income of only about $3,100.00 in 1947
as contrasted with $6,900.00 in cities of one million or more. Another interesting comment was that salaried lawyers, mainly in
large cities, had a higher median 1947 income than their colleagues
in independent practice-$6,100.00 compared with $5,300.00. For
those in independent practice, incomes tended to increase with
the size of the law firm. Practicing lawyers associated with other
members in partnerships- from five to eight members had a median
income of $16,800.00 as compared with $4,300.00 for independent
practitioners. Lawyers operating expenses are high, absorbing,
on the average, about one-third of their gross income in 1947.
Frequently, two or more lawyers share the same office to reduce
overhead costs.
JACOB V. SCHAETZEL.
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LOOKING FOR A LAWYER?
MICHAEL FOONER
Editor's Note: The following is a digest of an article published
in the January 1954 issue of Medicual Economic.s. The advice given
to doctors by Mr. Fooner on how to select a lawyer may be of equal
value to lawyers who are interested in acquiring new clients and
holding old ones.

Lining up a legal adviser before you need one may save you
a lot of grief. Here's how to choose a man who'll serve your special needs.
Most lawyers are, so to speak, "G.P.s" in that they're supposed
to be able to handle all kinds of legal matters. If your attorney
should find it necessary to call in a colleague on a particularly
knotty problem, he'll usually tell you about it. So, when choosing
an attorney, you probably won't have to worry about whether he's
an expert on malpractice charges or income tax cases.
It's wise to pick a man who has time to see you and listen
to your problems for you're likely to need an ear more often than
a mouthpiece. If an attorney's practice is too heavy, you may
never feel sure that his best thought and attention are being devoted to you. You'll want a man who practices in his office, not
out of it. A surgeon wrote an informal note to a patient who was
disputing a bill. Later when the doctor decided he'd have to sue
to collect, he found that what he had written could be used as
strong evidence for a substantial reduction in the debt. Why
hadn't he asked his attorney about the note before sending it? He
had called twice. But each time the lawyer was "out on a big case"
and had never bothered to call back. So the surgeon had gone
ahead on his own.
The man you select must feel a certain involvement in your
problems if the client-lawyer relationship is to be successful; and
you ought to like him too. No amount of technical ability can
compensate for a deficiency in personal regard.
Ideally he'll be a practical, common-sense attorney, to whom
you can entrust all your personal and professional affairs. Thi
means, of course, that you'll probably do well to avoid the attorneyscholar who is interested only in theories of higher jurisprudence;
or the compulsive character who likes to appeal every case to a
higher court, regardless of cost or the Perry Mason type, who
shines in the dramatic courtroom action but hates desk work.
The man you're looking for needn't have been out of law school
very long, but he should at least be familiar with the usual legal
problems that are likely to arise. And he should be adept at dealing with them through the quickest and most effective channels.
For example, does he know people in legal, political, and financial
circles? If so, he can save you time and money.
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The state of his pocketbook, incidentally, should be healthy.
If it isn't he may at times be so eager for a wind-up of your legal
troubles and the payment of your bill, that he'll be forced to deprive you of benefits to which you are legitimately entitled. In
other words, he may be over-willing to negotiate for a quick (and
cheap) settlement.
By now the qualities you're looking for in a lawyer should be
pretty clear. But where, you ask, will you actually find the individual who fills the bill?
Why not consider a member of your family, a close acquaintance, a lodge brother, or a fellow-member of a social or church
organization? Here you have the advantage of knowing a good
deal about the man and about whether he'll fill your needs.
You may be overlooking a good bet just because you're used
to thinking of your patients only as patients. One of them may
be an excellent lawyer. Here again you have an advantage: You'll
know a lot about him, his attitudes, interests, intelligence and so
forth.
A generally useful method of finding a lawyer is simply to
inquire around among your fellow physicians, businessmen-friends,
and other people you respect. They'll not only come up with specific names but also give you instances of how certain attorneys
handled problems like yours.. If you're a stranger in the community and don't have such contacts, the best place to ask about
lawyers may be the neighborhood bank.
The Law School nearest you will be glad to supply the names
of competent local attorneys. The Bar Association can give you
a list of attorneys there who are highly regarded in the profession.
A dependable source of information about lawyers is the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory. It not only lists all American lawyers but also rates them as to experience and reputation.
You may like to know about the American Bar Association's
Lawyer Referral Service. Probably you won't want to use it yourself, but there will be times when a patient or his family needs
legal help-because .of death, accident or domestic or financial
trouble-and there's no one to turn to for advice except you.
Naturally, you'll want to recommend your own lawyer, if you
have a lot of confidence in him. But if in any such case you feel
that your motives for suggesting a specific person may be misinterpreted, you can bring the Lawyer Referral Service into the
picture, keep out of it yourself and feel sure the legal problems
will be in competent hands. The Referral Service is in no sense
a charitable affair. It's run by the local bar associations in about
90 localities in the U.S. to help the average citizen find an able
lawyer-and be sure of not being overcharged. Each office has a
director and a panel of experienced and reputable lawyers. Here's
the way it works: Anyone who thinks he may have a legal prob-
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lem can have a private talk with the director, a lawyer chosen for
his tact as well as legal skill. He'll tell the client whether or not
legal help would be useful and if he thinks it would, recommend
one of the lawyers on his panel.
A consultation with the Referral Service director costs nothing. The panel lawyers pledge themselves to charge a set fee.
$5.00 in many locales-for an original consultation. When a case
requires further work, they estimate the future fees. If a dispute
over fees arises later, it's submitted to the bar association's committee for arbitration. About 50,000 people used the Lawyer Referral Service last year and the number is reported to be growing.
The real life-saver is to have an established lawyer-client
relationship before you need an attorney. If you haven't established a working relationship with a lawyer, you may find yourself
using your own "common sense" in working out what is essentially
a legal matter. But "common sense" legal opinions are about as
valid as "common sense" medical judgments. Sooner or later you'll
talk or write yourself into trouble. If you don't have a lawyer of
your own, you'd better line one up before emergencies arise.

COURT NEEDS COLORADO REPORTS
Mitchell B. Johns, Judge of the recently created Superior
Court of Denver, is in need of Volumes 79-85 of the Colorado Reports. Contact Judge Johns at room 420, City and County Building, Denver 2, Colorado. The Bar Association has frequent inquiries regarding the availability of Colorado Reports. Anyone
having knowledge of available volumes is urged to contact the
Secretary of the Bar Association, 702 Midland Savings Building,
Denver 2, Colorado. The demand for complete sets of the Colorado
Reports and Colorado Appeals is very great.

THERE'S ALWAYS AN EXCEPTION
A Bar Examination Answer: One will not lie in the face of
his Makers especially when he is about to meet Him. However, I
do not believe New York follows this rule.-Reprinted from the
Bar Examiner.

There is no profession in which moral character is so soon
fixed as in that of the /aw.-Judge Sharswood.
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REPORT ON MID-YEAR MEETING OF
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATIONATLANTA, MARCH, 1954
Loyd Wright of Los Angeles, former president of the Los
Angeles Bar Association and of the State Bar of California, was
nominated to be the next president of the American Bar Association in the caucus of state delegates. John D. Randall of Cedar
Rapids, Ia., a member of the House since 1948 and now chairman
of the Rules and Calendar Committee, was nominated to be chairman of the House of Delegates for a two-year term. Joseph D.
Stecher, of Toledo, 0., was renominated for a tenth term as ABA
secretary, and Harold H. Bredell of Indianapolis was renominated
for a sixth term as treasurer of the Association.
Four nominees were chosen for seats on the Board of Governors: Elwood H. Hettrick, of Boston, dean of the Boston University law school, to represent the first circuit; Osmer C. Fitts,
Brattleboro, Vt., former president of the Vermont State Bar Association, second circuit; Blakey Helm, Louisville, Ky., long-active
member of ABA and currently of the Municipal Law Section
council, sixth circuit; Thomas M. Burgess, Colorado Springs, Colo.,
former president of the Colorado State Bar Association, tenth
circuit.
Elections to fill all of the posts will occur at the Annual Meeting in Chicago August 16-20, and the terms of those elected will
begin at that time. Nomination is tantamount to election in the
A. B. A.
If elected, Thomas M. Burgess will be the second Colorado
lawyer in the history of the American Bar Association to serve on
its Board of Governors. The only other Colorado attorney to so
serve was G. Dexter Blount. Although Mr. Burgess has faithfully
and effectively represented the Colorado Bar Association in the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association for many
years, his nomination to the Board of Governors was unexpected.
Mr. Burgess will now represent all of the states comprising the
Tenth Judicial District.
One of the decisions of the Board of Governors in its sessions
Mar. 5 and 6 was to accept the invitation of Dallas, Tex., to be host
to the Annual Meeting of ABA in 1956. The Board also elected
to hold the 1955 Mid-year Meeting of the House of Delegates in
Chicago. Other Board actions included:
Approved a proposal to expand the mailing list of
the Coordinator to include all members of ABA committees and section councils.
Received a report on the Bar Center campaign including these statistics: Total contributions, $1,230,000
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or 82% of the goal; total number of contributions 12,475,
of which 20% came from non-members of ABA.
Made further plans for the 1954 Annual Meeting in
Chicago upon receiving word from President Jameson
that both Vice-President Nixon and Chief Justice Earl
Warren had accepted invitations to appear on the program. Chief Justice Warren will address the Bar Center
dedication ceremony, and the Vice-President will speak
at the annual banquet.
Formally requested the American Bar Foundation
to undertake, as a major research projeft, a review of
the canons of professional and judicial ethics with a view
to their applicability to present day conditions.
Authorized the Public Relations committee to study
the advisability of one or more films to portray the activities of the American Bar Association, and the American Law Student Association.
Timely issues and newsworthy personalities combined to produce a steady flow of news about the Atlanta meeting events in
the nation's press and on the airwaves. One of the widely-publicized events was the "debate" on Canon 35 prohibiting the photographing, broadcasting or televising of courtroom proceedings.
Speakers on that subject, before a meeting of the American Judicature Society, were Superior Court Judge Philbrick McCoy of Los
Angeles and Editor N. R. Howard of the Cleveland News.
Judge McCoy emphasized that the judges of the nation-as
well as some sections of the press-recognized the need for some
means to preserve courtroom decorum following the Hauptmann
trial, and that Canon 35 (adopted in 1935) was the result. He
declared: "If we are to retain the confidence of the public in our
courts those of us who have the direct responsibility for maintaining proper dignity and decorum in the courtroom must accept the
strong guidance of this canon."
Editor Howard referred to Canon 35 as "dogmatic," as not
sufficiently explicit as to where photographs may not be taken, and
as failing to cover other possible infractions of courtroom dignity.
He said that in Ohio, where the state Supreme Court just recently
adopted the canon, "I am sure I could manage a survey of interpretive enforcement of the canon as wide as the Atlantic ocean
and depending on each judge's notion as to how much territory
the canon is presumed to cover."
The McCoy-Howard discussion, plus the authorization of a
review of the canons as a research project of the Research and
Library Committee of the Bar Foundation, heightened prospects
that a thorough study of Canon 35 will be made in the light of
new developments in the field of public communications. Neither
of the speakers at the Atlanta discussion held that the problem
could not be solved to the satisfaction both of the judiciary and
the press.
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Other program events eliciting widespread press attention
were the addresses of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., on the
role of the United Nations, and of Senator John W. Bricker, vowing to continue the fight in Congress for adoption of treaty amendment bearing his name.
An unusual feature of the meeting of the National Conference of Bar Presidents was the presentation of a sample television
show by a panel of three Atlanta lawyers. The show was "The
Law Says," presented weekly under the sponsorship of the Atlanta
Bar Association and the Lawyers' Club of Atlanta. The show has
the highest listener rating of any locally-produced TV show in
Atlanta.
Interest in this presentation was heightened by the fact that
many state and local bar associations are presently sponsoring,
or planning to sponsor, TV shows aimed at informing laymen of
laws and the services lawyers perform. In the case of the Atlanta
show, the fact that questions were invited from the listener audience resulted in several bar presidents inquiring whether that
practice violated Canon 27 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Indications were that an official interpretation would be sought
from the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances.
HOUSE OF DELEGATES ACTION ON MAJOR ISSUES

Following is a brief and unofficial topic summary of action
by the American Bar Association House of Delegates at its midyear meeting in Atlanta. It does not purport to embrace all
matters that came before the House.
Specialization, and Specialized Legal Education
The House took a significant first step toward establishing a
system of controls over the standards of education and experience
which should be required for specialists in various fields of the
law. The House adopted a resolution of the Board of Governors
approving such a program "in principle" and delegating to the
Board of Governors, subject to final approval of the House of Delegates, the "implementation, organization and financing of such a
plan." The Board's resolution was based upon a detailed report
and recommendations drawn up by the special committee, headed
by Charles W. Joiner of the University of Michigan law school,
which was commissioned to consider the subject.
Judicial and Congressional Salaries
The House endorsed the recent recommendation of a special
Presidential commission that salaries of U. S. district judges and
members of Congress be raised from $15,000 a year to $27,500.
Comparable increases would be provided for circuit and supreme
court judges. Bernard G. Segal of Philadelphia, chairman of the
Presidential commission, told the House that A.B.A. leadership
in the campaign for adequate compensation for judges and legislators was the "greatest service to good government and a strong
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judiciary" since the Association's fight against the court-packing
plan in 1937. Congress is expected to act on the salary proposals
in early April.
Constitutional Amendments
No further action with reference to the Bricker amendment
respecting the treaty-making power was taken by the House.
Neither the interested sections nor committees of the Association,
in their reports to the House, proposed any additional policy pronouncement on that issue. However, the Standing Committee on
Jurisprudence and Law Reform urged House approval of another
Constitutional amendment proposal, Senate Joint Resolution No.
3, aimed at prohibiting Presidential seizure of private property as
in the case of the steel industry. The House voted to postpone action on the recommendation until the Annual Meeting of the House
in Chicago in August. At the suggestion of the same committee
the House voted to disapprove two other bills pending in Congress:
(HR 344) to authorize temporary appointments of U. S. circuit
judges to the Supreme Court where necessary to provide a quorum,
and (HR 642) to require a Supreme Court majority of not less than
five in any case in which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction.
Criminal Law
After brisk debate, the House endorsed the so-called "immunity
bill" in Congress (HR 6899) under which witnesses before Congressional committees (as well as before federal courts and grand
juries) could be compelled to testify under grants of immunity
assented to by the Attorney General notwithstanding their plea
of possible self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. This
bill was favored by the Section of Criminal Law, and also by the
Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives.
However, the House declined to approve a "wire tap" bill (HR
477) under which the FBI and certain federal security agencies
could intercept communications in the interest of national security
and defense. The bill was re-referred to the Section for further
study.
Social Security
The controversial issue of including lawyers and other selfemployed persons within the framework of the federal social security system again came before the House, in the form of a report
by Chairman Allen L. Oliver, Cape Girardeau, Mo., of the Unemployment and Social Spcurity Committee. Mr. Oliver told of the
preliminary results of a survey currently being conducted among
all state bar associations, and approximately 100 selected large and
small local bar associations, to ascertain "grass roots" sentiment on
both compulsory and voluntary plans of lawyer-inclusion. Total
returns to date showed: Compulsory plan, five in favor and eight
opposed; voluntary plan, ten in favor and eight opposed; not yet
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ready to report, 18. On the basis of these still incomplete returns
Chairman Oliver expressed the opinion that rank and file sentiment
for inclusion "was not as great as had been claimed," and while his
committee submitted no recommendation to the House he said its
members continued to be unanimously opposed to such inclusion.
He estimated that social security tax contributions from lawyers
would amount to $24,300,000 a year and referred to benefits which
most lawyers might expect as "illusory."
Public Relations
Three recommendations of the Public Relations Committee
were approved: (1) authorizing the committee to cooperate with
private producers of commercially sponsored television shows
dramatizing the law and the courts; (2) authorizing the committee to act promptly, in the name of the American Bar Association,
to correct or otherwise counteract erroneous or misleading statements about the Association or the legal profession in any of the
media of public information; and (3) approving the creation of
an advisory council consisting of professional public relations consultants of state and local bar associations to aid in integrating the
public relations activities of the organized bar. A proposal that the
committee prepare and distribute to all lawyers in the nation a
pamphlet emphasizing the individual responsibility of attorneys
to help strengthen the public relations of the profession, and to
participate in the activities of the organized bar, was referred to
the Administration and Budget committees of the Board of Governors for further study.
Membership Campaign
The accelerated campaign for membership in the A.B.A.
was described by Chairman Archie M. Mull, Sacramento, Calif., of
the Membership Committee and Chairman C. Baxter Jones, Jr.,
Atlanta, of the Junior Bar Conference. Mull said the ultimate goal
is to double the present membership of approximately 51,000. The
House voted to cooperate in the Junior Bar Conference's "Membership Month" campaign during March by pledging each House member to furnish the names of ten non-member lawyers whom they
would be willing to sponsor for A.B.A. membership.
Individual Rights
The House was informed by the Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by National Security that it wished
more time to compile its report on a study of Congressional hearing
procedures. Its first report is scheduled to be presented to the
House at the Annual Meeting in August. The Committee has completed its staff and the House was informed by Chairman Whitney
North Seymour, of New York, that the Committee proposes to
work closely with Congressional leaders of both parties. The study
is being financed by a $50,000 grant front the Fund for the Republic.
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Hawaii Statehood

Some of the sharpest debate of the two-day House sessions
developed over a proposal by Delegate J. Garner Anthony, of Honolulu, to endorse the Hawaii statehood bill pending in Congress. An
amendment to include statehood for Alaska in the endorsement
was defeated by a voice vote of the House. The House also voted
down, 60 to 50, a move to defer action on either statehood bill until
the Annual Meeting with public hearings to be held in the interim.
The Hawaii statehood bill was endorsed.
Taxation
A long series of proposed amendments of the Internal Revenue Act (covering 48 pages in the printed House calendar) were
recommended by the Section of Taxation, and adopted in their entirety by the House. The recommended changes in the act relate,
among other things, to filing dates, penalties, marital deduction
provisions of estate tax laws, exemption of inherited property from
the gift tax where the decedent, or the individual, renounces the
interest, the taxation of income of estates and trusts, and the like.
The recommendations go to the House Ways and Means Committee, now engaged in an extensive rewriting of the Internal
Revenue Act.
Mineral Law
The Section on Mineral Law submitted to the House a farreaching proposal for a thorough re-examination of the federal
government's land ownership policy. It urged that Congress make
a thorough study to determine how much of the more than 409
million acres of land now owned by the federal government could
be returned to private ownership for development for oil, timber
or farming purposes. The Board of Governors took the position,
and so advised the House, that it considered this proposal to be
outside the scope of the objectives and purposes of the A.B.A.
House Chairman David F. Maxwell so ruled when a point of order
was raised and his ruling was sustained by the House.

DICTA ISSUES NEEDED
Back issues of Dicta are always in demand to supply law
libraries throughout the state and country. If you have any issues
to donate please notify the Bar Association office, 702 Midland
Savings Building, Denver 2, Colorado. Postage will be paid or
arrangements made to pick up any quantity of back issues offered.
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NEGLIGENCE: CLARK V. THE . JOSLIN DRY GOODS
COMPANY.' The plaintiff in error, Kittie Clark, brought action
for injuries sustained in a fall upon the sidewalk in front of defendant, Joslin's store. She alleged that her injuries were proximately caused by defendant's negligent manner of window washing. This alleged negligence consisted of permitting water to collect
on the sidewalk during this operation. At the conclusion of the
plaintiff's evidence the case was taken from the jury and judgment
entered for defendant. Upon writ of error to the Supreme Court
of Colorado the decision of the lower court was affirmed. The
grounds upon which the affirmance was based being a lack of any
evidence of negligence upon the part of the defendant, the obvious
inference is that either plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of her fall or the mishap was an unavoidable accident.
The court's reference to and quotation from Garbanativ. City of
Durango,2 indicates that the prior and not the later accounted for,
in the eyes of the court, the plaintiff's injury. In either event the
decision is completely orthodox in that regard.
The interesting feature of the opinion is the following language by the court:
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that
the window washing being done on the morning of the
accident, was conducted in other than the usual and customary manner of performing such task.
From this statement it appears that the court is considering evidence of custom and usage without first requiring that the existence
of the custom and usage be established. It is to be noted that the
defendant had put on no evidence. It seems inconceivable that
the plaintiff would offer evidence of the custom and usage in the
trade and thus defeat herself. Apparently, then, either Colorado
does not require any evidence of custom and usage to establish
this defense to alleged negligence or our Supreme Court will take
judicial notice of accepted methods of window washing. In either
alternative this would, indeed, appear to be strange law.
EDWARD L. TRUE.
JUDGMENTS: A CUSTODIAL ORDER IS NOT A FINAL
JUDGMENT. Where there is a right there should be a remedy;
but apparently this is not always true.
In the recent case of Miller v. Miller - the Supreme Court of
Colorado disregarded one of the most fundamental principles of
of procedural due process, the right of judicial review.
The Supreme Court held that where a child becomes a ward
Colo.
-, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 2, p. 37
30 Colo. 358, 70 P. 686.
:'Colo. -,
(1953-54) C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 7.

-
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of a county court by virtue of a divorce action, the court has continuing jurisdiction and a custodial order is not a final judgment
which can be appealed.
Chapter 46, section 165, '35 C.S.A., provides that "appeals
may be taken to the district court of the same county, from all
final judgments and decrees of the county court, except judgments
by confession, by any person aggrieved by any such final judgment
or decree." How should the words "final decree" be interpreted?
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that a judgment awarding
temporary alimony is final in the sense that it may be reviewed
from the Supreme Court when rendered in a
by writ of error
4
divorce action.
The words "final judgment," as used in the Rules of Civil
Procedure governing writs of error and as used in the statute governing appeals from the county court to the district court, apparently do not have the same meaning. There should be no distinction between an order granting temporary alimony and an order
governing the custody of children so far as finality of judgment
is concerned.
If Colorado continues to require a greater degree of finality in
a judgment to appeal to the district court than is required for a
writ of error from the Supreme Court, then an aggrieved parent
is without an effective remedy.
LOREN PARRAGUIRRE

OPINIONS OF COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES
OPINION NO. 1
(Adopted July 31, 1953)
The Committee has been asked to pass upon the propriety of
the following language used by an attorney on business cards,
letter-heads, and envelopes:
(Lawyer's name)
Attorney at Law-Certified Public Accountant
(Lawyer's address)
Attention is called to the following language in Opinion No.
272 of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the
American Bar Association:
We are all confident that a lawyer could not, as a
practical matter, carry on an independent accounting business from his law office without violating Canon 27.
The Committee all agree that a lawyer, who is also
a C.P.A. may perform what are primarily accounting serv'Daniels v. Daniels, 9 Colo. 133, 10 P. 657 (1886).
Miller v. Miller, 78 Colo. 376, 241 P. 1112 (1925).
Tedman v. Tedman, 78 Colo. 57, 239 P. 877 (1925).
Hultquist v. Hultquist, 77 Colo. 260, 236 P. 777 (1925),
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ices, as an incident to his law practice, without violating
our Canons. We are also agreed that he may not properly
hold himself out as practicing accounting at the same office as that in which he practices law....
The Committee is in agreement with the language above quoted
and considers it controlling.

OPINION NO. 2
(Adopted July 31, 1953)
The Committee has been asked to consider the propriety of
using the imprint "Tax Expert" on the office door and business
cards and other stationery used by an attorney.
The Committee is of the opinion that such usage is improper
and that Opinion No. 175 of the Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances of the American Bar Association is controlling.
This Opinion reads in part as follows:
We are of the opinion that it is not permissible to include in a simple professional card language indicating
that the lawyer restricts his practice to any particular
class of work not generally recognized as a specialty. Obvious examples of the latter are "Admiralty" and "Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights." Any class of work which
the average lawyer is equipped and willing to handle cannot be said to be a specialty despite the fact that a lawyer
may restrict himself to such a class of work and acquires
an unusual degree of proficiency and experience in handling the same. Any specification of particular types of work
necessarily carries an inference that unusual ability or experience is asserted and consequently noticed or advertised. The fact that the motive may be to obviate the necessity of refusing other types of work does not avoid the
inference....

ATTENTION LAWYERS
Attorney, 28, married, LL.B., LL.M. -1 year local trust
department experience, desires position in a low office or firm.
HA 4-3107, 411O2 Upham, Wheatridge.

